Following the Trump administration’s abrupt cancelation of the Revolution Wind project at the end of August, Revolution Wind LLC, a joint venture between Ørsted and Skyborn Renewables, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to prevent enforcement of the stop work order. Revolution Wind contends that the order was motivated by political partisanship and that the administration’s claimed “national security” justification was arbitrary and capricious. 

On a parallel track, Connecticut and Rhode Island brought a similar action in Rhode Island District Court, claiming that the cancellation order was baseless and harmed ratepayers in both states, which were to have been the beneficiaries of the 704 MW of anticipated generation from the project. Revolution Wind had completed all state and federal reviews, including the Department of Defense, and was approximately 80% completed at the time of the order.

The Trump administration has also announced its intention to revoke federal approvals for New England Wind, which is not yet under construction, and other projects off the coast of Maryland. Revocation of these permits would complete the targeting of active and pending offshore projects off the coasts of Maryland, Massachusetts, New York (with the exception of Empire Wind, which was able to reverse a revocation order), New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind, a 60% completed offshore project that has maintained the support of Republican Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin, has thus far been allowed to proceed.

Connecticut’s environmental remediation laws are about to change significantly on March 1, 2026. This blog series, and the companion Release Report video series, will highlight key features of the new release-based cleanup regulations (referred to as “RBCRs”) so interested parties can get ready.

Background

At present, much of the environmental remediation in Connecticut is driven by the Connecticut Transfer Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-134 et seq.). The Transfer Act requires site-wide environmental investigation and potential remediation when an “establishment” is “transferred.” Establishments include specifically-identified types of businesses (e.g., dry cleaners, vehicle body repair shops, furniture strippers) and sites or businesses that generated 100 kg of hazardous waste in any one month since November 1980.  

Since the Transfer Act is triggered by real estate or business transfers, one could avoid the Transfer Act by avoiding becoming involved in a transfer.  Unfortunately, that kills deals and chills economic development. Furthermore, many sites that have not been transferred have not been subject to clear investigation and remediation triggers, leaving contaminated sites with no obvious impetus for anyone to clean up. Both of these factors lead to a pivot away from the Transfer Act through Public Ac 20-09 and the implementing regulations that followed.

New Law

After March 1, 2026, new transfers of establishments will no longer require action under the Transfer Act. Instead, Public Act 20-09 (codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-134pp et seq.) requires releases to be investigated and remediated when they occur or are discovered, not as part of a mandated site-wide program.  Specifically, § 22a-134qq provides that “[n]o person shall create or maintain a release to the land and waters of the state in violation of” the statute. 

While it appears that the word “create” will be understood in its ordinary sense, the word “maintain” deserves attention. The RBCRs provide that a person is “maintaining” a release if they own a parcel of land on or under which such release (or portion of the release) is located. If a tenant discovers an existing release, they must notify their landlord or may be deemed to be maintaining the release themselves. In other words, any business with operations in Connecticut has the potential to “create” a release, and any property owner in Connecticut has the potential to “maintain” a release on its property. 

The spill reporting regulations at R.C.S.A. 22a-450-1 et seq. set forth the procedure for reporting newly occurring releases, with the new RBCRs providing new requirements for cleanup and closure. For existing releases, obligations to investigate and remediate begin with the “discovery” of such release. The next blog post, and companion episode, in this series will discuss in more detail what it means to discover an existing release.

What’s Next?

Between now and March 1, there are a number of things that manufacturers, property owners, developers and others should be thinking about as they prepare for the implementation of the RBCRs. Upcoming blog posts and episodes will discuss reporting requirements, closure documentation, due diligence considerations and more.  If you have any questions or suggestions, please email me at escott@rc.com.

A new video podcast series is coming to Environmental Law +! The Release Report: Inside Connecticut’s Release-Based Cleanup Regulations will highlight the transformative changes set to unfold with the replacement of the nearly 40-year-old Transfer Act.

Join me, Emilee Mooney Scott, an Environmental partner and member of the Working Group convened under Public Act 20-09, as I explore Connecticut’s evolving environmental landscape with the implementation of the Release-Based Cleanup Regulations set to take effect on March 1, 2026.

Don’t miss the first episode dropping on Wednesday, September 10!

In the meantime, check out the preview for The Release Report (below) and my related post, “It’s Official, The Transfer Act Will be ‘Sunset’.”

On Friday, August 22, 2025, the Trump administration announced the cancellation of the Revolution Wind project located off the south coast of Rhode Island, east of Block Island. At the time of the stop work order, the project, based out of the State Pier in New London, Connecticut, was approximately 80% complete with foundations in place and 45 of 65 turbines installed. Revolution Wind was slated to provide 304 MW of power to Connecticut and 400 MW of power to Rhode Island. Following the completion of the project, the State Pier was poised to take delivery of parts for Sunrise Wind, an 84-turbine project off the coast of Long Island with the capacity to provide 924 MW of renewable energy. Ørsted, the beleaguered developer of both projects, announced that it would comply with the order while evaluating its options and continuing to secure funding for Sunrise Wind. Connecticut’s federal delegation questioned the basis for the stop-work order, which referenced unspecified national security interests.

The cancellation of Revolution Wind is reminiscent of the administration’s April 2025 stop work order for the Empire Wind project off the coast of Long Island, which was under development at the time. There, the U.S. Department of the Interior ultimately reversed its order following an intensive lobbying effort by Equinor ASA, the developer, which had coordinated with New York federal, state, and city officials to get the project back on track. 

Elsewhere, the lawsuit brought in a Massachusetts federal court by a coalition of 17 states and the District of Columbia following the Trump administration’s January 20, 2025 executive order blocking federal permits for all new offshore wind development continues.  Opposition briefs to summary judgment motions were filed on August 22, 2025.  The plaintiffs argue that the administration’s “indefinite, across-the-board suspensions are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law” under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Government contends that the U.S. Department of Interior’s decision to follow an executive directive is a “quintessential non-final agency action” that is not subject to judicial review.

After a few decades of uncertainty and “it’s-alive-it’s-dead-it’s-alive” swings, EPA’s “once in, always in” (OI/AI) policy is once again dead. And this time, it seems very dead.

On June 20, 2025, President Trump signed a Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolution that rejects a September 2024 rule adopted by the Biden EPA that had revived a narrowed version of OI/AI.  

Given its long and controversial life and its little-heralded demise, it seems fitting to give OI/AI a eulogy.

OI/AI began life as an internal EPA policy memo in 1995. The policy provided a complex interpretation of “emits or has the potential to emit” as used in the definition of a “major source” of federally-designated hazardous air pollutants (HAPs): if a facility’s potential to emit HAPs ever exceeded “major source” thresholds after the first compliance date of any substantive requirements of a “major source” HAP standard applicable to that facility, the facility must comply “permanently” with such standard and other requirements for HAP “major sources,” even if the facility later were to reduce its potential emissions below the thresholds. In other words: once in, always in. For more background, see our prior articles here and here.

Over the years, the policy met increasing criticism. While the policy had the well-intentioned goal of reducing HAP emissions, the basis for it in the Clean Air Act (CAA) was not apparent. In essence, the policy was an extremely expansive interpretation of “emits or has the potential to emit” in the CAA’s definition of “major source” of HAP in CAA § 112(a)(1), with little to no support from the statutory text. This interpretation was a far cry from a plain-English reading of simple present-tense verbs. It was also at odds with the EPA’s plain-English reading of similar language used to define a “major source” for other CAA programs.  

Further imperiling its longevity, the OI/AI policy was based solely on an internal EPA memo, without Administrative Procedure Act notice-and-comment rulemaking. The result, undoubtedly not intended, was a classic “trap for the unwary” that added further complexity to the CAA and introduced unpleasant surprises in regulatory compliance inspections and transactional due diligence.

The surge of regulated party discontent eventually led to a regulatory tug-of-war. The Bush II EPA made initial moves to undo the OI/AI policy, but these stalled. In 2018, however, the Trump I EPA withdrew the policy as not supported by the CAA, and then revised CAA regulations to expressly allow a facility to shed “major source of HAP” status by reducing its potential emissions. But OI/AI wasn’t dead yet. In September 2024, the Biden EPA adopted a final rule containing a more qualified version of “once in, always in” for facilities that emit certain higher-risk HAPs. That regulation has now been deep-six’ed by the June 2025 CRA resolution.

Per the CRA, future efforts to revive a similar OI/AI regulation would require Congressional approval. A revival also would likely face hostile judicial terrain, particularly in a post-Chevron/Loper Bright world (as many are aware, the Loper Bright decision overruled Chevron’s holding that where a statute is ambiguous, courts should give significant deference to the implementing agency’s interpretation). Even under Chevron, it’s not clear that the OI/AI policy would have survived: it’s not at all certain that the CAA language “emits or has the potential to emit” is ambiguous, so EPA’s interpretation seems unlikely to have received judicial deference under Chevron. A revived version of OI/AI would also need to run a gauntlet of the Supreme Court’s now-dominant textualism and skepticism regarding expansive statutory interpretations by agencies that substantially broaden their power. 

Never say never – but this time, OI/AI for major sources of HAP seems dead and buried.

In May 2025, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA) released an updated Site-Specific Targeting (SST) Inspection Program directive. The SST Inspection Program is OSHA’s main site-specific programmed inspection initiative for non-construction workplaces that have 20 or more employees. The SST Inspection Program uses employer-submitted injury and illness information (i.e., Form 300A data) to determine workplaces that will receive comprehensive (e.g., site-wide) inspections. The updated SST Inspection Program now utilizes Form 300A data for calendar years (CY) 2021, 2022, and 2023.

The main focus of the revised program is establishments with high injury and illness rates reported between 2021 and 2023, especially those with inconsistent record-keeping or injury rates exceeding twice the national private sector average. For example, sectors like trucking, warehousing, and nursing facilities tend to have higher Days Away, Restricted, or Transferred (DART) rates, which OSHA uses to assess injury severity.

This update signals a heightened focus on workplaces in sectors like warehousing, transportation, and healthcare. Employers in these industries should be prepared for increased on-site inspections. Notably, on-site inspections will not just be limited to workplaces with high rates of injuries. Workplaces with lower injury rates are also at risk of being randomly selected to verify the reliability of submitted data.

Other significant updates to the program include:

  • For high-rate establishments, individual establishments will be selected for inspection based on CY 2023 Form 300A data, instead of 2021 data.
  • For upward trending establishments, individual establishments will be selected for inspection based on CY 2021-2023 Form 300A data, instead of CY 2019-2021 data.
  • The low-rate establishments list will be generated using CY 2023 Form 300A data, instead of CY 2021 data.
  • The non-responders list will be generated using CY 2023 data, instead of CY 2021 data.

This update only reconfirms OSHA’s trend towards an increasingly data-driven approach, aiming to target workplaces with the greatest potential hazards. Employers are advised to scrutinize their injury logs and ensure accurate documentation, especially if their data indicates rising or elevated injury rates.

It is also important to keep in mind that while OSHA may begin an on-site inspection for one reason (e.g., injury rates), these inspections often result in citations for unrelated violations observed during the inspection. That being said, with anticipated workforce reductions within OSHA and other budget cuts, OSHA’s ability to maintain a robust number of on-site inspections is uncertain. Nevertheless, employers should proactively review their injury data, address hazards, and ensure compliance to avoid surprises during inspections.

This post was co-authored by Summer Associate Alexandra Prendergast. Alexandra is not admitted to practice law.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 8-0 ruling limited the scope of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the national environmental law that mandates federal agencies to assess the environmental effects of their proposed actions before making decisions. In the May 29, 2025, decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, the Supreme Court found that substantial judicial deference should be afforded to agencies under NEPA, and that NEPA does not require agencies to consider the environmental effects of projects that are separate in time or place from the project at hand.

The case concerned construction of an 88-mile railroad line connecting Utah’s oil-rich Uinta Basin to the national freight rail network to facilitate the transportation of crude oil to refineries along the Gulf Coast. As part of its project review, the Surface Transportation Board (Board) prepared a 3,600-page environmental impact statement (EIS) that addressed significant environmental effects of the project and identified feasible alternatives, as required under NEPA. The Board concluded that the project’s transportation and economic benefits outweighed its environmental impacts and approved the railroad line. Eagle County, Colorado, and several environmental organizations challenged the Board’s EIS and final approval order in federal court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ultimately vacated the Board’s EIS and final approval order, holding that the Board’s analysis of environmental effects should have included reasonably foreseeable impacts from upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining projects.

The Supreme Court characterized the D.C. Circuit’s decision as belonging to a line of NEPA cases guided by an overly aggressive judicial approach. According to the Court, NEPA is a purely procedural statute that requires an agency to prepare an EIS, but does not require an agency to weigh environmental consequences in any particular way. The Court further emphasized that NEPA is a “procedural cross-check” to inform agency decision-making, not a “substantive roadblock.” It further criticized the use of NEPA by project opponents as a “blunt and haphazard tool” to stop or slow new infrastructure and construction projects. 

When determining whether an agency’s EIS is compliant with NEPA, the Court affirmed that courts should afford “substantial deference” to the agency. The essential determination is “not whether an EIS in and of itself is inadequate, but whether the agency’s final decision was reasonable and reasonably explained.” Thus, courts must defer to agencies so long as they are operating within this “broad zone of reasonableness.”

The Court distinguished Seven County from its recent landmark decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which applied de novo judicial review in cases when an agency interprets a statute. In cases in which an agency exercises discretion granted by statute, judicial review is conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard, under which a court asks whether the agency action was reasonable.

This judicial deference in NEPA cases extends to factual determinations made by agencies about what details are relevant in an EIS. The Court affirmed that an EIS must address the reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of the project at hand. However, the Court also noted that courts should defer to agencies about the scope of analysis, including decisions about how far to go in considering indirect environmental effects from the project at hand and whether to analyze environmental effects from other projects separate in time or place from the project at hand.

Seven County’s limitations on the required scope of agency analysis under NEPA to the direct and indirect environmental effects of the project at hand may streamline agency review of infrastructure, construction, and energy projects. However, uncertainty remains as agencies determine the extent of analysis required during project review, which may differ by agency or types of projects or may change with administrations. The ruling may also cause environmental groups to reconsider when and how to mount challenges to projects under NEPA. 

As recently reported, on May 19, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Interior reversed the stop work order it issued on April 16, 2025, thereby allowing the $5 billion, 2 GW, Empire Wind project to proceed. On June 3, 2025, a coalition of Empire Wind opponents sued the Trump administration in federal court in New Jersey, claiming the reversal of the stop work order was unjustified. The plaintiffs assert that the bases for the original stop work order were clearly articulated in the administration’s January 20, 2025, executive order, which halted all offshore wind development pending an investigation and review of all related federal permits by the Secretary of the Interior. The plaintiffs claim that the May 19 reinstatement order, allowing Empire Wind to proceed, was issued without explanation or factual basis, in contravention of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Specifically, they allege that the reinstatement order makes no reference to the results of the “investigation” required by the original stop work order.

In light of the administration’s sudden reversal of a stated policy position, it comes as no surprise that proponents of the original policy are aggrieved. When the reversal comes with no justification or reasoned basis, as plaintiffs allege, the court will need to decide whether it runs afoul of procedures mandated by the APA.

On May 23, 2025, President Trump signed four new executive orders (the Orders) to “usher in a nuclear energy renaissance.” In an article, the White House explained that the Orders provide “a path forward for nuclear innovation” as they “allow for reactor design testing at [Department of Energy (DOE)] labs, clear the way for construction on federal lands to protect national and economic security, and remove regulatory barriers by requiring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [(NRC)] to issue timely licensing decisions.” Characterizing the Orders as “the most significant nuclear regulatory reform actions taken in decades,” the White House declared that it is “restoring a strong American nuclear industrial base, rebuilding a secure and sovereign domestic nuclear fuel supply chain, and leading the world towards a future fueled by American nuclear energy.” Below is a summary of some of the significant aspects of the Orders.

Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the Department of Energy

  • Finds that the design, construction, and operation of certain DOE-controlled advanced reactors fall within DOE’s jurisdiction.
  • Directs the Secretary of Energy to take actions to reform and streamline National Laboratory processes for reactor testing at DOE, including but not limited to, revising regulations to expedite the approval of reactors under DOE’s jurisdiction to enable test reactors to be safely operational within 2 years following submission of a substantially complete application.
  • Directs the Secretary of Energy to create a pilot program for reactor construction and operation outside the National Laboratories, and to approve at least three reactors under this program with the goal of achieving criticality in each of the three reactors by July 4, 2026.
  • Directs the Secretary of Energy to eliminate or expedite internal environmental reviews for authorizations, permits, approvals, and other activities related to reactor testing.

Deploying Nuclear Reactors for National Security

  • Directs the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Secretary of the Army, to create a program for building and deploying a nuclear reactor at a domestic military installation by September 30, 2028.
  • Directs the Secretary of Energy to take actions to deploy a privately funded advanced reactor to power artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure and meet other national security objectives at a DOE site within 30 months.
  • Directs the Secretary of Energy to designate certain AI data centers that are located at or operated in coordination with DOE facilities as critical defense facilities, where appropriate, and the electrical infrastructure that power them as defense critical electric infrastructure.
  • Directs the Secretary of Energy to make available at least 20 metric tons of high-assay low-enriched uranium for private sector nuclear projects powering AI infrastructure at DOE sites.
  • Directs the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to enable the construction and operation of privately funded nuclear fuel facilities at DOE and/or Department of Defense (DOD) controlled sites for use in national security reactors, commercial power reactors, and non-power research reactors.
  • Directs the Secretary of State to take certain actions to promote the U.S. nuclear industry in the development of commercial civil nuclear projects globally.

Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  • Establishes a goal of quadrupling American nuclear energy capacity from 100 gigawatts (GW) to 400 GW by 2050.
  • Directs the reorganization of the NRC and a reduction in force in consultation with the Department of Government Efficiency.
  • Directs the NRC to undertake a wholesale review and revision of its regulations and guidance within 18 months, including but not limited to, establishing:
    • Fixed deadlines to evaluate and approve new reactor license applications within 18 months and applications for the continued operation of existing reactors within one year;
    • Science-based radiation limits, instead of relying on the linear no-threshold model for radiation exposure;
    • An expedited approval process for reactor designs that have been safely tested by the DOD or DOE; and
    • A process for high-volume licensing of microreactors and modular reactors.

Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base

  • Directs the Secretary of Energy to recommend a national policy regarding management of spent nuclear fuel and the development and deployment of advanced fuel cycle capabilities, evaluate policies concerning commercial recycling and reprocessing of nuclear fuels, and make recommendations for the efficient use of nuclear waste materials.
  • Directs the Secretary of Energy to develop a plan to expand domestic uranium processing and enrichment capabilities to meet projected civilian and defense reactor needs.
  • Halts the surplus plutonium disposition program, with certain exceptions, and directs the Secretary of Energy to process and make surplus plutonium available for advanced reactor fuel fabrication.
  • Leverages the authority in the Defense Production Act to seek voluntary agreements with domestic nuclear energy companies for the cooperative procurement of enriched uranium and for consultation regarding the management of spent nuclear fuel.
  • Directs DOE to prioritize the facilitation of 5 GW of power uprates to existing reactors and construction of 10 new large reactors by 2030.
  • Directs DOE’s Loan Programs Office and U.S. Small Business Administration to prioritize funding to support the nuclear energy industry.
  • Seeks to expand the American nuclear workforce by directing the Secretaries of Labor and Education to increase participation in nuclear energy-related training and apprenticeship programs and ordering the Secretary of Energy to increase access to DOE’s National Laboratories for nuclear engineering students.

Overall, the Orders signal a renewed commitment to revitalize the U.S. nuclear energy industry and build upon a well-established bipartisan consensus in favor of nuclear innovation, accelerating nuclear deployment, and strengthening domestic uranium supply chains. Nonetheless, efforts to reduce federal staffing and weaken NRC’s regulatory independence could compromise the viability of the Trump administration’s goal to “unleash nuclear energy in the U.S.,” placing greater importance on sound regulatory execution and legally durable policymaking.

On May 19, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Interior reversed its April 16 stop work order and allowed the $5 billion, 2 GW, Empire Wind project 12 miles south of Long Island to proceed. The move follows an intensive lobbying effort by the project’s developer, Equinor ASA, who coordinated with federal, state, and city officials to get Empire Wind back on track. Unlike other projects affected by the Trump administration’s ban on offshore wind development, Empire Wind had received the necessary federal approvals and was under construction with ships at sea and others on standby when Secretary of the Interior, Doug Burgum, directed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management to halt construction. Despite the disruption and a costly month’s delay, Equinor still aims for the project to be operational in 2027.

In a statement, Equinor’s president and CEO thanked President Trump directly for allowing the project to continue. It remains to be seen whether the administration, which has demonstrated a transactional approach and willingness to work with commercial and governmental parties caught up in its larger policy pronouncements, will be receptive to the entreaties of other offshore projects impacted by the permitting ban.